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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, 
Appellant, 
Case No. 880448 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal seeking review by the Supreme Court 
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations 
of Discipline of the Board of Bar Commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar finding unprofessional conduct on behalf of the above named 
attorney, Benjamin P. Knowlton. The Recomendation of Discipline 
was that the Attorney be suspended from the practice of law for 
six months, five months which would be stayed upon the conditions 
that the attorney (1) spend a period of actual suspension of 
thirty (30) days and (2) pay to the complainant Karen Lehmberg 
Trujillo the sum of $4,995,95 within said period of suspension. 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by Article VIII Section 
4, Utah Constitution and Rule 14, Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar. 
1 
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I: THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
ATTORNEYS CONDUCT VIOLATED THE REVISED RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE 
BAR. 
POINT II: UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
ATTORNEYS CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISHONEST AND 
INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING. 
POINT III: THAT THE RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE IS UNDULY 
HARSH AND INAPPROPRIATE. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Benjamin P. Knowlton is an attorney licenced to 
practice law in the State of Utah and has been since 1981. In 
addition, he has been licenced to practice law in the State of 
California since 1980. Transcript of hearing, page 136. 
Mr, Knowlton had known a Mr. Ellis Lehmberg more than 
twenty (20) years prior to the claims involved herein, which 
covered the period from 1982 to 1984. He was a close friend with 
both Mr. Ellis Lehmberg and Mr. Lehmbergs former wife, Karen 
Basso Trujillo. Tr. H. 137, 151, hereinafter Ms. Trujillo. Mr. 
Knowlton had represented Mr. Lehmberg on numerous legal matters 
both civil and criminal. Tr. H. 137. He was retained by Mr. 
Lehmberg to assist in the sale of a home on behalf of Ellis 
Lehmberg, including various liens which were attached to the 
home. At that time Mr. Lehmberg owed Mr. Knowlton, in addition 
to the monies paid in connection with the sale of the house, 
substantial monies for attorneys fees. These amounts were 
estimated to be between $4,000.00 and $7,000.00 by Mr. Lehmberg, 
Tr. H page 78, and approximately $7,550.00 by Mr. Knowlton. Tr. H 
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page 181. 
Mr. Lehmberg and his wife owned a house during the 
course of their marriage. Ms. Trujillo quit- claimed her interest 
in the house to her parents, the Bassos and Mr. Lehmberg prior to 
the initiation of the Divorce proceeding in this case. Tr, H page 
41. On behalf of Mr. Lehmberg, Mr. Knowlton expended 
considerable time and effort dealing with judgement creditors on 
the property and getting them to take less than the full amount 
of their judgement in full satisfaction of their claims. In 
addition, he was able to arrange the sale of the house which 
resulted in a net return over and above the payment of the 
judgement and expenses and attorneys fees for Mr. Knowlton for 
his efforts in the sale of the house. Ultimately, a check was 
issued to Mr. Knowlton as Trustee for Mr. Lehmberg and Henry and 
Elaine Basso in the amount of $5,599.95. Tr. H 142-4, Findings of 
Fact, numbers 1 and 2. 
Ellis Lehmberg and his wife Karen separated and a 
divorce was initiated in the spring of 1982. As part of that, an 
Order to Show Cause was brought by Ms. Trujillo and various 
hearings held before the Court on that Order to Show Cause that 
ultimately resulted in the issuance of a Stipulation Order (sic) 
dated the 8th day of September, 1982, by Judge Uno. That Order 
recited 
"That the monies held in Trust by 
Mr. Benjamin P. Knowlton, Attorney at Law, 
on behalf of both of the parties, shall 
continue to be so held in Trust, and that 
both parties are hereby restrained from 
disposing of said Trust Funds, except as 
3 
agreed to by both parties and their Counsel." 
At the hearing when Mr. Knowlton was in attendance, the issue was 
addressed as to the money in his account. Mr. Mitsunaga, Ms. 
Trujillo's attorney, testified that Mr. Knowlton acknowledged 
that he would hold the money in Trust pending final adjudication 
of the case Tr. H. page 14. Mr Knowlton testified that he 
recalled the Judge asking him if he was holding any funds in 
Trust, to which he replied yes, and he replied yes to a question 
about making some of the funds available to repair Ms. Trujillo's 
car. Tr. H. 145-6. Counsel For Mr. Lehmberg at that hearing, Mr. 
Thorn Roberts, recalled that Mr. Knowlton acknowledged that he had 
the monies but that no Order was made directing Mr. Knowlton to 
do anything concerning the monies Tr. H at page 116-7. 
On or about January 25th 1983, the Lehmberg's divorce 
trial was held before Judge Judith Billings. The Court indicated 
that she was going to award the monies from the sale of the 
house, in the possession of Mr. Knowlton, to Ms. Trujillo. That 
fact was conveyed to Mr. Knowlton by Ms. Trujillo's attorney on 
January 25, or 26th 1983. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were initially signed by Judge Billings on February 5th, 
19 8 3 without them having been properly prepared and forwarded 
onto Counsel. Ultimately, amended Findings and Conclusions were 
entered April of 1983. Record at 150. 
Mr. Mitsunaga as Ms. trujillo's attorney, delivered a 
letter to Mr. Knowlton on January 26, 1983, the day following the 
divorce, demanding the monies which he held. Record at 77. Mr. 
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Knowlton took that letter and contacted D. Aaron Stanton, an 
attorney at his office with regard to obtaining his monies from 
the funds held in Trust. Testimony D, Aaron Stanton, Tr. H page 
71 Mr. Stanton advised Mr Knowlton that he had a legal lien on 
the money for his fees, and was therefore entitled to it. Tr. H. 
page 76. Mr Knowlton then contacted the attorney for Ellis 
Lehmberg, Mr Thom D. Roberts, and asserted the lien and claims to 
the money. By letter dated January 27th 1983, Ellis Lehmberg's 
attorney advised him of the claim by Mr. Knowlton to the specific 
proceeds. Record at 66. Tr. H page 133. 
Mr Knowlton never paid to Ms. Trujillo the monies which 
he had held in his account. Based upon his fees owing from his 
client Mr. Lehmberg , his possession and assertion of the 
attorneys lien over the proceeds, he withdrew the funds from his 
account. Tr, H page 147. In August and September of 1983 Mr. 
Knowlton attempted to settle the claim with Ms. Trujillo by 
payment of some monies based upon Mr. Knowlton's sense of 
justice, Tr. H. 151-2. That was refused by Ms. Lehmberg and suit 
initiated. That suit, Lehmberg v. Knowlton Third District Court, 
Civil No. D82-1770 ultimately resulted in judgement for the 
plaintiff as against the defendant. However, the matter was 
decided while attorney Knowlton was out of the State believing 
the case would be continued. Tr. H. at page 158. Further, the 
Findings of Fact by Judge Conder in that case purported to adopt 
a finding from the divorce, which was not a finding with regard 
to the status of the monies. See Finding of Fact Number 7 and 
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record at 133. 
After Karen Trujillo gained a judgement against Mr. 
Knowlton and payments were not immediately forthcoming, the 
disciplinary process was begun in earnest. Other than the 
present action, Mr. Knowlton has had no Bar Action or complaints 
sustained against him. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
ATTORNEYS CONDUCT VIOLATED THE REVISED RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR. 
The Bar in essence treated this case as Mr. Knowlton 
stealing monies out of his Trust Account which belonged to his 
client, without any basis to do so. However, Mrs. Trujillo was 
not his client, the individuals entitled to the proceed from the 
sale of the house, Ellis Lehmberg and the Bassos, have never 
complained and Mr. Knowlton took all actions necessary to receive 
the monies as fees prior to Mrs. Trujillo having interest in 
them. 
POINT II THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
ATTORNEY'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISHONESTY AND 
INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING. 
Mr. Knowlton was concerned about the treatment of monies 
which he was holding in an account which he referred to as a 
Trust Account. He had claims for attorneys fees owing from a 
client who had the major legal right to said monies. After 
seeking advise of Counsel and prior to the monies legally being 
converted to the beneficial interest of any other party, he 
6 
exercised self help and asserted an Attorneys lien and took the 
monies. Such actions negate any dishonesty or intentional wrong 
do ing on be ha, 1 i of M r: • Know 1 to n. 
POINT III THAT THE RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE IS UNDULY HARSH 
AND INAPPROPRIATE. 
The it: ecommendeci d i s cIp ] i ne i s exce s s i ^  re J y harsh in this 
particular case, based upon Mr. Knowlton's lack of intentional 
wrong doing and his efforts in ascertaining his appropriate 
course ". f act,ion , in addi tion, compared to other sanctions 
imposed, this sanction is excessive. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
ATTORNEYS CONDUCT VIOLATED THE REVISED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR. 
It i". lli'-> Bar's position essentially that Mr. Knowlton 
stole money out of his Trust Account which beloi igeci to ei tl: lei a 
client or someone that he a Fiduciary Trust relationship with, 
that person being Ms. Trujillo. It Is Attorney's position that 
the Bar is misapplying the facts, and the conclusions to be drawn 
from the facts, and misinterpreting the disciplinary process. 
From Attorney Knowlton's point of view, this was a situation 
where he fae J o n g e d t o h :i s 
Client Ellis Lehmberg with potential n^ht.s in another pair of 
individuals, Henry and Elaine Basse r« Knowlton was owed money 
in excess 11: i e a c c o l 1 n t £ o r 
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attorney's fees for service previously rendered to Mr. Lehmberg. 
He contacted an attorney with regard to the manner in which he 
could take those funds, and was advised by the attorney that he 
consulted, Mr. D. Aaron Stanton, that he had an attorney's lien 
and need take no further action to perfect the lien and that he 
was therefore entitled to the monies. He then took the monies 
as and toward his attorneys fees. Subsequent to that a third 
party, in the context of a civil proceeding to which Mr. Knowlton 
was not a party, received an award that as between her and Mr. 
Knowlton client, she was entitled to any interest which may then 
be existing in and to those monies. That third person sought 
relief against Mr. Knowlton in the lawsuit between her and Mr. 
Knowlton client, which was denied on the basis that there was no 
outstanding Order effecting Mr. Knowlton. (See Order on Hearings 
signed by Judge Croft, record at 157.) This third party then 
filed suit against Mr. Knowlton which, due to a comedy of errors, 
resulted in a trial where Mr. Knowlton was not present and could 
not present his defense, resulting in a judgement against him, 
which judgement had not been satisfied. Now, the Bar is 
attempting, as a part of its disciplinary processes, to compel 
him to satisfy the vast majority of that Judgement. 
The Bar takes the position that at a hearing on June 
19, 1982, attorney Knowlton somehow, by acknowledging existence 
of certain monies in his account, thereby became obligated, in 
that a relationship was created between him and Ms. Trujillo, 
with respect to those funds. However, the basis of that 
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relationship is never specified, The District Court obviously 
found that there was none created in context of the suit, because 
•. ...:•! - - • - . •• : ~ .-••• wrought against Mr. 
Knowltor Furthe: , !-: Trujil .o a:,,, ;,•.. attorney, Mr. Mitsunaga 
never testified as to any agreement of Trust or directions which 
they expressed or requ i red of I ir Know] ton any time prior to the 
initiation of their lawsuit. 
The Bar further takes the position and states the 
posit t p i i r s i i a n t t • : 1: I : v orce Decree M s . Trujillo 
"succeeded le interest of El^is Lehmberg in said Trust funds" 
and that Mr. Knowlton was therefore obligated to pay all such 
mo n i e s a s 1 I e h a d 1 : o h e r , Ho we ve r, this ignores the fact that 
prior to entry of the Decree - the time whe;. .-.-s. :uiillo 
actually obtained the right to Ellis Lehmberg's claims to the 
mon i es - M:i : Knowlton had contacted an attorney, asserted a 
lawyers lien and the right to self help o /er f„ht- monies and 
extinguished Mr. Lehmbergs interest in and to said monies. 
Therefore, when the Divorce Decree granted to Ms. Trujillo all of 
Mr. Lehmbergs interest in and to said . Les there was no 
interest left at that time. 
Attorney Knowlton views this as a claim by a third 
party -* i. \ . . \ 7 i 11: 1 a c omme r c i a 1 11: a n s a c t i o 1 1, a rid no t w i 1: h 
his ethical obligations and duties in connection with the conduct 
of his practice, stated in In Re Disciplinary Action of 
McCune, :al: 1 (] 9 86 )
 J this Court stated at :. pages 
705-6: 
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The disciplinary procedures of the Court and Bar are 
not intended to serve as an alternative means of 
dispute resolution for third persons who have monetary 
disputes with attorneys. The practice of law not 
infrequently leads to commercial disputes that can and 
should be resolved in the civil Courts. The 
disciplinary rules of the Bar are designed to assure 
that lawyers handle their professional affairs with 
great integrity and competence. Those rules are not 
designed to allow those who have nonprofessional 
disputes to invoke the spectre of a disciplinary action 
simply as added leverage in trying to settle a business 
dispute with an attorney. 
The instant case, however, is morr than a business 
dispute. George McCune received monies from his 
clients to pay debts incurred in handling their legal 
affairs. He held the money in a fiduciary capacity 
with the understanding that it was for a specific 
purpose. He then failed to pay it to those to whom it 
rightfully belonged. All this was done in his 
professional capacity and in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and of fundamental standards of 
honesty. 
The present case lacks all of the indica of fiduciary duties and 
express direction with regard to the monies. What you have is a 
corpus of money being held by Mr. Knowlton, with the 
beneficiaries of that money to be Mr. Knowlton's client Mr. 
Lehmberg and Henry and Elaine Basso. Mr Knowlton, being owed 
monied for attorneys fees, engaged in self help to collect his 
fees and received those monies. The beneficiaries of those 
monies, Mr. Lehmberg and the Basso's, have never complained. Ms. 
Trujillo claims those monies through Mr. Lehmberg, but she 
obtained her right to them after Mr. Knowlton had received them 
and claimed them as his own. 
But for the civil judgement against Mr. Knowlton in 
favor of Ms. Trujillo, it should be clear that Ms. Trujillo 
should proceed in the divorce case to get her former husband to 
10 
pay the value of the monies that she was awarded, which monies 
had been used for Mr. Lehmberg's purposes and payment of his 
a 1 1 o i: II e y £ e e s T1 11 i s s In e c o u 1 d s e e k 1: o Mo d I £ y t h e I) e c i: e e o £ 
Divorce to require Mr, Lehmberg to pay her the actual values of 
the monies, since Mi ^ehmberg had conveyed those for a good and 
v a il i J, a b 1 e c o n s i d e . o n , A 11 h o \ i g I: i 1 ! s T i: u j i 3 ] o in i g h t b e 
considered an innocent and injured party, that is because she did 
not receive th e appropriated share o: her marital state from 
h e i: h i I s b a n d , 1 1 it: K v - > u ] ci - : a i: 1 y fa e c o n s j d e r e d a n 
innocent injured party i; .r,ar. he will have to repay monies which 
he has received from a clierv: which monies w e r e in p a y m e n t of 
right £ i i 1 a 11 o r n e y s f e e s p r e v j <: »i i s 1 y e a r n e d. 
This matter has to do with the nature of the commercial 
collection of preexisting debts among various claimants to 
nioni es , not w:i th regard to Mr Know • ixiiict as an attorney. 
Therefore, the finding and conclusion "...ct Mr. Knowlton engaged 
in conduct in violation of tille Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct is j i I error 
POINT II THE UTAH STATE BAR ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
ATTORNEY'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISHONESTY AND 
INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING. 
The Utah bar has taken the position that Attorney 
KnowJ ton i i I essence sto 1 e ' these monies £roin Kar en Ti: uj i 1 1 o . 
Their second Conclusion on law number 3 is that the taking of the 
monies constituted a "" conversion" , and the Aggravation : 
Recommendation of Di scipline indicates that takim: . , ;.es 
constitutes "specific intent and knowing conversion of said 
11 
monies,"indicating a specific intent to engage in wrongful 
conduct, knowing it is wrong. It is attorney Knowlton's position 
that those conclusions are factually wrong as well as ignoring 
critical legal elements. 
As noted above Ms. Trujillofs rights to the monies only 
matured into reality upon the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
Prior to that time, Mr. Knowlton exercised dominion over those 
monies as well as his claimed attorneys lien. There was no other 
contractual or other basis for imposing a Trust relation on Mr. 
Knowlton with respect to Ms. Trujillo. Therefor, since all 
actions necessary for Mr. Knowlton to own the monies had been 
accomplished prior to Ms. Trujillo having any rights to the 
monies, his action were not in derogation of any his duties to 
her or her rights to existing monies. 
A factual determination of this specific intent to 
engage in wrongful conduct is also problematical based upon the 
undisputed evidence with regard to Mr. Knowlton's conduct. There 
is no doubt that he was owed substantial monies from Mr. 
Lehmberg, probably in excess of the total amount in his account. 
Further, prior to his taking the monies, he obtained independent 
Counsel to review the situation and to advise him, Mr. D. Aaron 
Stanton who testified at the trial on the complaint. Tr, H. at 
70-77. And further, prior the entry of the Decree - the time when 
Ms. Trujillo1s interest perfected and attached the monies - Mr. 
Knowlton formally gave notice of his assertion of his lawyers 
lien and his claim to those specific funds to Mr. Lehmberg's 
12 
attorney, and thereby Mr. Lehmberg. See Letter of Lehmberg's 
attorney, r ecord at 63 
Based upon the claim of right ^f Mr, Knowlton, his 
seeking independent Counsel advise, following that advise, and 
g I v I n g p r o p e r n o t i c e t o t h e i n t e r e s t e <:i p a r t i e s , i s d i f £ i c u ] t t o 
sustain a finding of dishonesty or specific intent to engage in 
wrongful conduct. It is further difficult to believe that said 
acts woii 1 ci a t 1 ea s t co n s t i 11 11 e " ini 11 gat ion" i n co n n e c 11 o i I w 11 h 
the Recommendation of Discipline, Thus, it is clear that the 
Recomendation of Discipline, based upon an incorrect Finding of 
Disci:.;. i ; . . ^ xcessi^ « e, 
POINT . THAT THE RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE IS UNDULY HARSH 
AND INAPPROPRIATE. 
This point concerns two related concepts in connection 
with the recommended discipline. As noted, recommendation was 
that attorney Ki lowlton be suspended f< :o: a period of si :; : months, 
five months to be stayed upon doing 30 day actual suspension and 
restitution of $5,000,00 to Ms. Trujillo. It is attorney 
Know] toi I 's claim that discipline is excessive based upon (1) the 
particulars of this case, (2) as well as in relationship to other 
disciplinary proceedings before this Court. 
A 3 i s i:e £ 1 ected i n the transci:ipt o£ the Proceedings 
with regard to the Recommendation of Discipline, a Stipulation 
was entered into concerning that proposed discipline. As stated 
I J d y e 12 Tr an s c 11 p L UJ Proceed unj L. , f1 L K: i o w i t o n s Counsel 
stipulated to the appropriateness of the recommended discipline 
if 
13 
...(Y)our finding of violation of dishonesty 
by the conversion was based upon actual evil 
or improper intent on Mr. Knowlton's behalf, 
if it was actual bad faith in terms of taking 
the money, then an appropriate sanction would be... 
It is clear that such is not what we are dealing with here. As 
noted by Ms. Summner, at page 12, that did not appear to be the 
concern of the hearing panel although that is ultimately the 
discipline they imposed. The Stipulation was if there were 
knowing and intentional theft of monies by Mr. Knowlton which he 
knew belonged to someone else and that he had no right to, then 
the discipline was appropiate Such is clearly not the case here. 
As noted previously, Mr. Knowlton sought and obtained 
• advise by independent Counsel as to the propriety of taking the 
money, which advise he followed. Further, he gave notice to his 
client's attorney, and those initially entitled to the monies 
have never complained. It should be clear that such facts, 
basically undisputed, would at least be in mitigation of any 
violation, although the Bar found that they did not find them as 
mitigation. Thus, the discipline imposed should be far less than 
that, based upon Mr. Knowlton's claim of right to the monies, and 
his actions. 
Assuming that the actions of Mr. Knowlton with regard 
to these monies were improper, the question is what should have 
Mr. Knowlton have done with regard to his handling of these 
monies, other than the absolute standard of not taking them. Mr. 
Knowlton consulted with other attorneys about the matter, 
including hiring one to render a specific opinion, which Mr. 
14 
Knowlton followed. He further gave notice of his li en and 
acti ons 1 1|! "  :; ' • ] i ent, as the person interested in the monies 
which he hac a duty ai id ob 1 igation toward. To i mpose such a 
severe sanction as that here, based upon Mr:. Knowlton' s actions 
-eking others , would fail to follow the purpose and 
reasons for the imposition of sanctions. 
As stated in In Re Phil L. Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (1970) 
a t page 41 7: 
" We note in our awareness that when there has been a 
deviation from proper professional standards there 
should be some appropriate penalty, not only for the 
effect upon the attorney, but as a salutaury measure 
for the benefit of the Bar and the public. Yet, there 
are other matters of importance bearing on the proper 
judgement herein. Disbarment of an attorney for a 
period of one year, thus interrupting his practice and 
depriving him of the means of livelihood, has a number 
of serious effects upon him, his el ientele and those 
dependent upon him." 
In Re Phil L. Hansen cites for the above In Re Robert B. Hansen, 
584 P.2d 805 (Utah 1978), which stated at page 806, in connection 
with pun I shment: 
Speaking in generality, it is to be realized that the 
attainment of a profession usually represents, in 
addition to the years of education devoted to that 
purpose, the commitment of a lifetime to a man's career 
and that therefore, the depravation of that privilege 
is something which should not be done lightly, nor at 
all unless the attorney is guilty of some culpable 
wrong or there is some other serious matter to justify 
that kind of surgery on his means of livelihood. 
The recommendation by the Utah State Bar of a punishment is 
advisory upon this Court. •• n Re Phil Hansen, supra. 
Further as stated in In Re Robert B. Hansen, supra, at page 807, 
in discussing the reducing of the imposed discipline from the 
15 
recommended one year suspension to a public reprimand: 
We have reviewed the foregoing matter in awareness of 
our previous declarations of this Court that, though it 
is the prerogative and responsibility of the Court to 
make the findings and Orders in such matters, we will 
nevertheless regard the findings and recommendations of 
the commission as advisory, and will accord them some 
degree of indulgence, and be inclined to act in 
accordance therewith unless it appears the commission 
has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, (footnotes 
omitted.) 
It is respectfully submitted that the recommendations with regard 
to discipline here do not take into account all of the relevent 
matters with regard to the conduct of Mr. Knowlton, the effect on 
the parties, and the legal nature of the proceedings. Further, 
it fails to take into account the existence of extensive 
mitigating circumstances and finds only aggravating 
circumstances. Therefore, this Court should exercise it's 
function and powers, reject the recommendations, and to the 
extent discipline is imposed, impose at most a public reprimand. 
It is further noted in the claim of attorney Knowlton 
that the suspension as imposed is excessive even assuming all of 
the claims of the Bar, based upon other discipline imposed. As 
noted above, in In Re Robert B. Hansen, the Court found improper 
conduct on behalf of that of Mr. Hansen in failing to properly 
account and pay over monies admittedly belonging to a client, 
collected on behalf of a client and co-mingled for a period of 
years as well as improper statements made to the press and 
individual jury investigation. Discipline recommended was one 
year suspension, reduced to a public reprimand. In Re Phil 
Hansen, supra, concerned charges clearly excessive fee and 
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defending an individual in a civil fraud suit, and during the 
pendency of the suit, defending the plaintiff on a imrelated 
criminal matter,. r t reduced the r ecommended discipline n|: 
one year disbarment and reduced it down to a requirement that the 
attorney acknowledged that he breached his contract with his 
client and i: ef ui id 1 ler fees Ii 1 In Re Don Leroy Bybee, 6 2 9 P . 2d 
423 (Utah 1981), the attorney violated his professional duties by 
the p r e p a r i n g and filing of false bonds i n d m a k i n g 
represents •. . .=•* ':.-: •• ; - • -: I = e .s>-^d:^g 
and prejudicial to the administration of justice, this Court 
affirmed the recommendation of the Bar that the lawyer be 
suspend*- .
 t - montl is, In In Re George McCune, 
supra, t±~~ attorney received monies from his client to pay for 
reporter fees and other expenses, and paid only a portion of 
those monies ovei ami kept <i Mibstant u I amount tor hi- own use. 
Despite Mr. McCunes contumacious conduct toward the disciplinary 
process, this Court only affirmed the recommended discipline of 
3 0 • :iai • s ai Id a requi rernent to pay ov er the monies gi ven to him by 
the client to those rightfully entitled to it and who the client 
had directed that be paid. 
The recommend di; ~», c I p ! i j i e w i t h r e g a r d to attorney 
Knowlton of six months, five months of which to be stayed, and 
restitution of certain monies. Is greater than any of the above 
mentioned cases w 1 :i i ch 1 Ia1! > e •••--. : the last ten years. 
Further, it is clear that the actions or the other attorneys i n 
or at least in some of those cases is far more severe improper, 
17 
and aggravating than that engaged in by Mr. Knowlton. Further, 
this is the first and only sustained disciplinary action taken 
against Mr. Knowlton in the eight years of his admission to 
practice in the State of Utah, and nine years in the State of 
California. Therefore, on the basis of the previously imposed 
discipline, of attorneys, that recommended by the Bar for Mr. 
Knowlton is clearly excessive, unreasonable, and inappropriate. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the discipline of Mr. 
Knowlton, if any, be reduced to at most a public reprimand. 
Further, this Court could make a direction to lawyers in the 
future, not to engage in any type of self help in collecting of 
fees, but to cheerfully decline to take monies belonging to a 
client and in the Attorney's possession, return said monies to 
the client and seek paymnet through further litigation, 
judgement, and execution thereon against one's clients. 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Utah 
State Bar erred in its determination and conclusion that Mr. 
Knowlton engaged in conduct in violation of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, specific, Mr. 
Knowlton engaged in conduct "involving dishonesty, conduct which 
adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law", or conduct 
which failed to avoid the "appearance of impropriety". Further, 
and at a minimum, the Utah State Bar erred in its assessment of 
culpability with respect to the conduct of Mr. Knowlton and 
recommended unreasonable and excessive discipline for the actions 
18 
of Mr Knowlton. Thus, to the extent this Court finds conduct of 
Mr. Knowlton in violation of his ethics as an attorney, any 
discipline imposed should be less than that recommended by the 
Bar, and at most be a public reprimand. 
DATED this day of March, 1989. 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
BY. 
Thorn D. Roberts 
Attorney for Defendant 
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OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re: ) ORDER AMENDING FINDINGS 
) OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON ) LAW AND RECOMMENDATION 
DOB: 05/12/44 ) OF DISCIPLINE 
Admitted: 04/30/81 ) 
) F-220 
This matter having come on for hearing pursuant to 
Respondent's Objections to Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendation on October 27, 1988, before a three-member 
Panel of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar 
and Respondent being represented by and through counsel, 
Thorn Roberts, and Christine A. Burdick, Bar Counsel, 
appearing and the Panel having heard arguments of counsel 
and having made its recommendation to the Board of Bar 
Commissioners at its meeting on October 28, 1988, and the 
Board being fully advised in the premises, order and decrees 
as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's Objections be 
and they hereby are denied; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Stipulation of Counsel 
to Amend Findings of Fact No. 12 be and it hereby is 
accepted and said Finding of Fact shall read: 
The Panel finds no violation of any ethical 
standard by reason of the non-payment of the 
judgment in Lehmberg vs. Knowlton, Third Judicial 
District, Civil No. D82-1770, entered against 
Respondent. 
DATED this ± day of fJpltCI^^Ly , 1988. 
Board of Commissioners 
By: 
Kent M. Kasting 
President 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re; 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON 
ORDER AFFIRMING 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND RECOMMENDATION 
OF DISCIPLINE 
Pursuant to Rule XII(d) of the Procedures of 
Discipline, the Board has reviewed the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline of the 
Disciplinary Hearing Panel. It hereby affirms those 
determinations, adopts them as its own, and incorporates 
them by reference into this order. 
DATED this 12 day of YY) 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order was served on Thorn D. Roberts at 10 
West 300 South #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and on 
David Knowlton at 2910 Washington Boulevard #305, P.O. 
Box 1379, Ogden, Utah 84401, Attorneys for Respondent, 
on this /ff^day of 1'HjXlU , 1988. 
^\\i L.C JUL ^ . 11 YuTtTC 
I 
V\oo V 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re; 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 




This matter having come on for hearing pursuant to 
notice on February 16, 1988, and continued for further 
hearing on February 24, 1988, before a Hearing Panel of the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar 
comprised of Dale R. Kent, Chairman, Joseph Gallegos and 
Molly Sumner and the Respondent being present and 
represented by counsel, Thorn D. Roberts and David Knowlton, 
and the Utah State Bar being represented by Associate Bar 
Counsel, Christine A. Burdick, and the Panel having 
admitted certain exhibits marked P-l through P-ll and R-l 
through R-9 and having taken testimony from Karen Trujillo, 
Jimi Mitsunaga, Ellis Lehmberg and Respondent and the Panel 
having heard arguments of counsel and being fully advised 
in the premises, makes the following Findings, Conclusions 
and Recommendation: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. ^Respondent was retained by Ellis Lehmberg to 
assist in the sale of a home on behalf of Ellis Lehmberg 
and Henry and Elaine Basso. 
FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 1 ftDo S" 
check made payable to him as trustee on behalf of Ellis 
Lehmberg and Henry and R. Elaine Basso in the sum of 
$5,599.95. 
3. On or about June 9, 1982, Respondent appeared 
before Third District Court Judge Uno at which time 
Respondent acknowledged receipt of said proceeds and agreed 
to hold the money in trust pending the outcome of the 
divorce between Ellis Lehmberg and Karen Lehmberg Trujillo. 
4. Respondent acknowledged releasing $600.00 for 
payment of car repairs for Karen Lehmberg Trujillo1s 
benefit per Judge Uno's order in the divorce action. 
5. On or about January 26, 1983, Attorney Jimi 
Mitsunaga notified Respondent that the money being held by 
Respondent in trust was awarded by the court to Karen 
Lehmberg Trujillo. 
6. Subsequent to January 26, 1983, Respondent 
understood that he continued to hold said monies in trust 
as evidenced by his August and Spetember 1983 tender of 
part of said monies to Jimi Mitsunaga on behalf of Karen 
Lehmberg Trujillo in response to Jimi Mitsunaga1s demands 
for payment. 
7. In addition to this Panelfs independent findings 
of fact, the Panel incorporates in these Findings, Finding 
No. 5 of Judge Croft's Findings of Fact in Lehmberg vs. 
FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 2 
y\oo £ 
Knowlton , Third Judicial District, Civil No. D82-1770, 
wherein Judge Croft found that the monies held by 
Respondent were held in trust. 
8. Respondent claimed that he had a personal right to 
the monies based on an attorney's lien pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-51-54 for attorney's fees owing to him for 
legal work performed for Ellis Lehmberg. 
9. For legal services rendered by Respondent for the 
sale of the home, Respondent received attorney's fees in 
the sum of $2,000.00 as reflected by the closing statement 
of the sale of the property and which payment Respondent 
acknowledged. 
10. Respondent did not establish by sufficient and 
clear evidence the amount of the attorney's lien which he 
claimed; all evidence with respect to the amount of 
outstanding attorney's fees owed by Ellis Lehmberg was, at 
best, speculative. 
11• Respondent never paid any of the monies held in 
trust to Karen Trujillo but rather converted to his own use 
the monies held in trust in the sum of $4,999.95. 
12. The Panel does not make any Findings with respect 
to whether non-payment of the judgment in Lehmberg vs. 
Knowlton, Third Judical District, Civil No. D82-1770, 
entered against Respondent is a violation of the Code of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
Based on the foregoing Findings, the Panel makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Upon the court's award of said monies to Karen 
Lehmberg Trujillo, a trust relationship was established 
between Respondent in favor of Karen Lehmberg, who by 
virtue of the divorce decree succeeded to the interest of 
Ellis Lehmberg in said trust funds. 
2. Utah Code Section 78-51-54 relating to attorney 
liens is only applicable to proceeds directly acquired from 
a cause of action in which an attorney represents the 
party; Respondent's claim of attorney^ fee related to 
legal services other than the legal services performed for 
the sale of the home. 
3. A common law lien for attorney's fees does not 
exist in the State of Utah. 
3. Respondent's couversion of those trust funds in 
the sum of $4,999.95 constitutes a violation of the 
following disciplinary rules: 
a. Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty; 
b. Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(6) engaging in conduct 
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law; and 
c. Canon 9, DR 9-101 failing to avoid even the 
appearance of impropriety. 
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the 
Panel makes -the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 4 
lA rtr\ & 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
Aggravation: 
1. Because Respondent accepted the trust check as 
trustee and acknowledged that he would hold such funds in 
trust pending the outcome of the divorce action, his 
failure to pay said monies to Karen Lehmberg Trujillo and 
his conversion of said monies to his own use constitutes 
specific intent and a knowing conversion of said monies. 
Mitigation: None. 
Respondent through his counsel and Associate Bar 
Counsel, Christine A. Burdick, have stipulated to the 
following recommendation of discipline; Respondent, 
however, has not stipulated to any of the Findings of Fact 
nor Conclusions of Law. Consequently, the Panel makes the 
following recommendation of discipline: 
1. Respondent shall be suspended from the practice of 
law in the State of Utah for period of six (6) months with 
five months stayed on the following conditions: 
a. Respondent be actually suspended from the 
practice of law for a period of 30 days to begin within two 
weeks of the entry of the Order of Discipline by the Utah 
Supreme Court; and 
b. Respondent pay as and for restitution to 
Karen Lehmberg Trujillo the sum of $4,999.95, said sum to 
be paid prior to the conclusion of the six month period of 
suspension-
FINDINGS OF FACT - Page 5 
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S&tswsnaa^^^exnu^rM^€fS^trbali' State Bar for 
all costs incurred in prosecuting these proceedings. 
3. In the event Respondent fails to comply with the 
Order of Discipline and the payment of restitution, an 
order to show cause shall issue ordering Respondent to 
appear before this Hearing Panel to show cause why the 
remaining five months of the suspension should not be 
imposed. 
DATED this day of . 1988. 
Le R. Kent/ Chairman 
Hearing Panel 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline was mailed certified mail 
return receipt requested to Thorn D. Roberts at 10 West 300 
South #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and David 
Knowlton at 2910 Washington Boulevard #305, P.O. Box 1379, 
Ogden, Utah 84401, Attorneys for Respondent, on this 
day of . 1988. 
• y k)/>i<u . 
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Oirfc Supr*m« ciurf, Utah' 
ROBERTS 6c ROBERTS 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 West 300 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-3550 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN LEHMBERG, 
Plaintiff, : STIPULATION ORDER 
vs : 
ELLIS HADERLIE LEHMBERG, : 
Defendant. : Civil No. D82-1770 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on regularly for 
hearing on the 9th day of June, 1982, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., 
on the issue of ^hild support, and the Plaintiff being present 
and represented by Mr. Jimi Mitsunaga, and the Defendant being 
present and represented by John Russell, appearing on behalf of 
[Thorn D. Roberts, this attorney of record, and the parties hereby 
stipulate and agree as follows to wit: 
1. That the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the 
sum of $120.00 per month, per child, a total of $240.00 per month 
as and for temporary child support. Said payments are to com-
mence in the month of June 1982 with $120.00 due on the 15th day 
of June, 1982, and $120.00 due on the 30th day of June, 1982, and 
the like days of the months thereafter. It is hereby represented 
that on said hearing date, the Defendant was unemployed. 
2. That the monies held in trust by Mr. Benjamin P. 
Knowlton, Attorney at Law, on behalf of both of the parties, shall 
continue to be so held in trust, and that both parties are hereby 
restrained from dispossing of said trust funds, except as agreed 
to by both parties and their Counsel. 
DATED this 3 / da? o f August, 1982. 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS <fp\ _ K t 
ORDER 
Based upon the above stipulation of the parties and 
good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered that the Defendant 
pay to the Plaintiff temporary child support of the sum of $120.00 
per child, per month, totaling $240.00 per month, commencing 
on the 15th day of June, 1982, in the amount of $120.00, the balance* 
on the 30th day of June, 1982, and continued thereafter on like 
days; and further, that the monies held in trust by Benjamin P. 
Knowlton, Attorney at Law, be continued to be held in trust for 
the above named parties, and that no withdrawl shall be made with 
out the joint written request of both attorneys for the parties. 
DATED this & day of AngTiW-, 1982. 
BY THE COURT: 
s£5%5fx <GL-^QZ-0" 
«(JJkM%^ Ju°8e'Kaymond $-Un~ 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
4 0 0 TEN BROADWAY BUILDING 
January 26, 1983 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 0 2 
TELEPHONE (SO!) 3 2 2 - 3 5 5 1 
Mr. Ben Knowlton 
Attorney at Law 
243 East 400 South, #100 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
Re: Lehmberg vs. Lehmberg 
Dear Mr. Knowlton: 
Please be advised that the Lehmberg matter has been tried 
and the Decree is now being prepared and that the Decree 
will provide that the monies that you are holding in trust 
for themf together with the interest accumulated thereonf 
should be forwarded to my office for the benefit of Karen 
Lehmberg pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. 
If you have any questions, please advise. 
Very truly yours, 
/ 
Jimi Mi tsunaga 
Attorney at Lav 
JM/b 
January 27, 1933 
Ellis Lehmberg^^ 
8425 South 1^7 East 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
RE: Lehmberg v. Lehmberg 
Dear Cheese, 
Enclosed you will find the letter which I received from your 
wife's attorney, and a copy of a proposed Assignment of Wages. 
Please contact me with regard to the matters contained therein, 
including the potential upcoming sale of your car. 
Further this is to advise you that Ben Knowlton called me and 
indicated that he is filing an Attorney's Lien against £he monies 
held in his truut account. I am not sure of the effect this will 
have on anything, bujr you should be advised of that. 
Further with regard to the divorce, I have not yet received any 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or proposed Decree. 
Upon my receipt of them I will forward them on to you. 
Sincerely, 
ROBERTS 6c ROBERTS 
THOM D. P.OBERTS 
TDR:cg 
e n d s 
(A-^n id 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 322-3551 
K. o:;- • 
BY ^Zl^l^jd^ 
FlMI MITSUNAGA 
ATTORNEY AT L A W 
EAST S O U T H T E M P L E | 
KLT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
8 4 1 0 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 





ELLIS HADERLIE LEHMBERG, 
Defendant. ) 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D82-1770 
The above matter came on for trial on the 25th day 
of January, 1983, at the hour of 9 a.m., before the 
Honorable Judith Billing, Judge, and the plaintiff 
present and represented by Jimi Mitsunaga, and the 
defendant present and represented by Thorn D. Roberts, and 
it appearing that more than ninety days has lapsed since 
the filing of the complaint and the plaintiff and 
defendant having been duly sworn and testimony given and 
exhibits received and the Court being advised of the 
premises and good cause appearing, herewith enters the 
foregoing: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the parties are residents of Salt Lake 
Ann \<~ \ i 
County, State of Utah) and have been for more than three 
months prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. The parties were married on the 27th day of May, 
1977. 
3. That the defendant treated the plaintiff cruelly 
causing her great mental distress and that the defendant 
provided no financial support to the plaintiff and has 
physically abused the plaintiff during the course of the 
marriage causing her great physical and mental distress. 
4. That there are two children born as issue of the 
marriage, Alexandria, born December 18, 1977, and 
Brandisf born October 24, 1981. That said children are 
in the custody of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is 
a proper person to have the permanent care, custody and 
control of the aforesaid minor children, subject to the 
right of the defendant to visit with said children at 
reasonable times and places. 
5. It is reasonable that the plaintiff receive the 
household furniture and fixtures currently in her 
possession as her sole and separate property, together 
with the stereo and stereo stand and a television console 
which is now in the defendant's possession, and it is 
reasonable that the defendant deliver the aforesaid items 
to the plaintiff forthwith. 
6. Further, it is reasonable that the defendant 
receive as his sole and separate property the property in 
JIM I MlTSUNAGA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
31 EAST SOUTH TEMPUEj 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
84102 
ftOo LL ^2 
his possession, 
7. It is reasonable that the plaintiff receive as 
her sole and separate property, the 1969 Mustang and that 
the defendant receive as his sole and separate property, 
the 1966 Blue Fairlane Ford automobile, 
8, That the plaintiff did have a family residence 
prior to the date of this marriage and that upon the 
marriage of the parties, the second mortgage was obtained 
by the parties. That the second mortgage was not paid 
and that the house was sold and the net proceeds is 
currently held by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, as trustee for 
the parties, in the amount of Five Thousand Five Hundred 
Ninety-nine dollars and ninety-five cents ($5,599.95), 
plus interest, said amount having been obtained from the 
sale of the residence. 
That at the time of closing the monies in the 
amount of Forty Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) was taken 
out of the joint proceeds to pay the Department of 
Recovery Services for the defendant's past due child 
support due from a prior marriage. 
It is reasonable that the entire amount held in 
trust by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, together with the 
interest accumulated therefrom, be awarded to the 
plaintiff as her sole and separate property, free and 
clear of any claims or right of the defendant. 
9. That the parties, during the course of the 
MI M l T S U N A G A 
nrORNEY AT L A W 
CAST SOUTH TEMPLE J 
T LAKE CITY. UTAH 
04102 
JlMI MlTSUNAGA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
SI CAST SOUTH TEMPLE) 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84102 
marriage, incurred joint indebtedness to the following 
named persons and that it is reasonable that the defendant 
assume and pay the aforegoing creditors mentioned below 
and to hold the plaintiff harmless from any claims 
arising therefrom: 
Dr. Joe Roberts 
Dr. Gerald Snarr 
Dr. Dallis VanWagoner 
Primary Children's Hospital 
Cottonwood Hospital 
Dr. Morris Mariece Baker 
Pathology Lab# 
10. It is reasonable that the defendant keep and 
maintain the medical coverage for the benefit of the 
minor children which he obtains through his employment. 
11. That the defendant earns approximately $800 to 
$900.00 net take home pay per month, and the plaintiff 
earns approximately $400 net take home pay per month. 
12. It is reasonable that the defendant pay to the 
plaintiff the sum of $150.00 per month per child, totalling 
$300.00 per month. Further, it is reasonable that the 
defendant pay the sum of $50.00 per month as permanent 
alimony until terminated by operation of law. 
Further, it is reasonable that the aforesaid 
payments commence on February 1, 1983, and that the.same 
shall be made payable to the Clerk of the Court. 
13. That the defendant has failed to abide by the 
temporary order providing for $240.00 per month for 
temporary support and that the defendant has failed to 
pay temporary support from October, 1982, to January of 
MI M l T S U N ' A G A 
T T O R N E Y AT L A W 
EAST SOUTH TEMPLE" j 
T LAKE CITY. UTAH 
84102 
1983, and that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment 
against the defendant in the sum of $$960.00. It is 
reasonable that so long as the defendant pays $100.00 per 
month towards the back judgment heretofore entered, that 
the plaintiff will be foreclosed from commencing any 
proceedings to execute or collect this judgment. 
14. That it is reasonable that the defendant pay 
to the plaintiff the sum of $500.00 as reasonable 
attorney's fees and that a judgment in the aforesaid 
amount be entered as against the defendant. 
15. The Court finds that due to the long 
separation of the parties and the violent nature of the 
relationship during the marriage and the lack of recon-
ciliation possibilities that the divorce should be made 
final upon entry. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now 
makes its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the parties are entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce, said decree to become final upon entry. 
2. That the plaintiff is awarded permanent care, 
custody and control of the two minor children born as 
issue of the marriage, Alexandria, born December 18, 
1977, and Brandis, born October 24, 1981, subject to the 
right of the defendant to visit with said children at 
reasonable times and places. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against 
^00 /? »35 
the defendant in the sum of $960.00 for back child 
support and so long as the defendant pays the $100.00 per 
month towards the back judgment heretofore entered, that 
the plaintiff will be foreclosed from any proceedings to 
execute or collect this judgment. 
4. That defendant is entitled to the sum of 
$150.00 per month per child, for a total of $300.00 per month 
for support of the two minor children and $50.00 as permanent 
alimony per month, until terminated by operation of law, 
and shall commence on February 1, 1983, payable to the 
Clerk of the Court. 
5. The plaintiff is entitled to receive the 
household furniture and fixtures currently in her 
possession as her sole and separate property, together 
with the stereo and stereo stand and a television console 
which is now in the defendant's possession, and the 
the defendant deliver the aforesaid items to the 
plaintiff forthwith. 
6. Defendant is entitled to receive as his sole and 
separate property, the property in his possession. 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to, as her sole and 
separate property, the 1969 Mustang and that the 
defendant receive as his sole and separate property, 
the 1966 Blue Fairlane Ford automobile. 
8. That the plaintiff did have a family residence 
prior to the date of this marriage and that upon the 
marriage of the parties, the second mortgage was obtained 
J^OD n a i 
MI MlTbUNAGA 
TTORNEY AT LAW 
:AST SOUTH TEMPLE J 
T LAKE CITY. UTAH 
84102 
by the parties. That the second mortgage was not paid 
and that the house was sold and the net proceeds is 
currently held by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, as trustee for 
the parties, in the amount of Five Thousand Five Hundred 
Ninety-nine dollars and ninety-five cents ($5,599.95), 
plus interest, said amount having been obtained from the 
sale of the residence. 
That at the time of closing the monies in the 
amount of Forty Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) was taken 
out of the joint proceeds to pay the Department of 
Recovery Services for the defendant's past due child 
support due from a prior marriage. 
Plaintiff is entitled to the entire amount held in 
trust by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, together with the 
interest accumulated therefrom, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any claims or right of the 
defendant thereon. 
9. That the parties, during the course of the 
marriage, incurred joint indebtedness to the following 
named persons and that the defendant is to assume 
and pay the aforegoing creditors mentioned below 
and to hold the plaintiff harmless from any claims 
arising therefrom: 
Dr. Joe Roberts 
D~r. Gerald Snarr 
Dr. Dallis VanWagoner 
Primary Children's Hospital 
Cottonwood Hospital 
Dr. Morris Ma^ riece Baker 
Pathology Lab. 
10. Defendant is to keep and maintain the medical 
JlMI MlTSUKAGA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
I EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
ALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
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coverage for the benefit of the minor children which he 
obtains through his employment. 
11. That the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in 
the amount of $500.00 as reasonable attorney's fees and 
that a judgment of $500.00 in the aforesaid amount be 
entered as against the defendant. 
DATED this J?_day of ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 9 8 3 . 
BY THE COURT: 
f/rtL yft AJi 
GE JUDITH BILLING^. / A 
A i I ^ 6 I 
Approved a s t o f o r m : H. DSXON HiMDLEY 
THOM D . ROBERTS ^ ^ Deputy Ctork 
Attorney for the Defendant 
FEB 8 2 !;5 Pil fOT 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
731 East South Temple 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
KAREN LEHMBERG, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
) Civil No. D82-1770 
ELLIS HADERLIE LEHMBERG, , >,•«-, $4/7 4 A//). ^ C 7 
Defendant. ) $ . . .. 
•ITSUNACA 
EY AT L A W 
SOUTH TEMPLE} 
E CITY. UTAH 
4102 
The above matter came on for trial on the 25th day 
of January, 1983, at the hour of 9 a.m., before the 
Honorable Judith Billing, Judge, and the plaintiff 
present and represented by Jimi Mitsunaga, and the 
defendant present and represented by Thorn D. Roberts, and 
it appearing that more than ninety days has lapsed since 
the filing of the complaint and the plaintiff and 
defendant having been duly sworn and testimony givan and 
exhibits received and the Court being advised of the 
premises and good cause appearing, and having entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. That the parties are awarded a Decree of Divorce, 
II said Decree to become final upon entry. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of the two minor children born as 
issue of the marriage, Alexandria, born December 18, 
1977, and Brandis, born October 24, 1981, subject to the 
right of the defendant to visit with said children at 
reasonable times and places. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against 
the defendant in the sum of $960.00 for back child 
support and so long as the defendant pays the $100.00 per 
month towards the back judgment heretofore entered, that 
the plaintiff will be foreclosed from any proceedings to 
execute or collect this judgment. 
4. That defendant is awarded the sum of $150.00 
per month per child, for a total of $300.00 per month 
for support of the two minor children and $50.00 as perma-
nent alimony per month until terminated by operation of 
law, and shall commence on February 1, 1983, payable to 
the Clerk of the Court. 
5. The plaintiff is awarded to receive the 
household furniture and fixtures currently in her 
possession as her sole and separate property, together 
with the stereo and stereo stand and a television console 
which is now in the defendants possession, and the 
defendant is to deliver the aforesaid items to the 
JlMI MXTSUNAGA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 11 
731 EAST SOUTH TEMPl_£ 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
IMI MlTSUNAOA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
EAST SOUTH TCMPLE} 
LT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
aintiff forthwith. 
6. The defendant is awarded as his sole and 
separate property, the property in his possession. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded, as her sole and 
separate property, the 1969 Mustang and that the 
defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property, 
the 1966 Blue Fairlane Ford automobile. 
8. That the plaintiff did have a family residence 
prior to the date of this marriage and that upon the 
marriage of the parties, the second mortgage was obtained 
by the parties. That the second mortgage was not paid 
and that the house was sold and the net proceeds is 
currently held by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, as trustee for 
the parties, in the amount of Five Thousand Five Hundred 
Ninety-nine dollars and ninety-five cents ($5,599.95), 
plus interest, said amount having been obtained from the 
sale of the residence. 
That at the time of closing the monies in the 
amount of Forty Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) was taken 
out of the joint proceeds to pay the Department of 
Recovery Services for the defendant's past due child 
support due from a prior marriage. 
Plaintiff is awarded to the entire amount held in 
trust by Ben Knowlton, Attorney, together with the 
interest accumulated therefrom, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any claims or right of the 
defendant thereon. 
9. That the parties, during the course of the 
marriage, incurred joint indebtedness to the following 
named persons and that the defendant is to assume 
and pay the aforegoing creditors mentioned below 
and to hold the plaintiff harmless from any claims 
arising therefrom: 
Dr. Joe Roberts 
Dr. Gerald Snarr 
Dr. Dallis VanWagoner 
Primary Children's Hospital 
Cottonwood Hospital 
Dr. Morris Mariece Baker 
Pathology Lab. 
10. Defendant is ordered to keep and maintain the 
medical coverage for the benefit of the minor children 
which he obtains through his employment. 
11. That the plaintiff is awarded to a judgment in 
the amount of $500.00 against the defendant as reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this £_day of JairtrcTryV #983. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDG IITH BILLING ~ 
Approved as to form: 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Attorney for the Defendant 
v t : % \j i 
v
— / - Ctaouty C R A 
.IlMI MlTSlTNAGA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
\ CAST SOUTH TEMPLE j 
ALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
84102 
*vo 3L 
JIMI MITSUNAGA //"*• - " " ^ 
Attorney for the Plaintiffy'/ X ,,-.,..; y.g s 
731 East South Temple \ { $ ,''-._
 Pv _ <&$&'&&€'<£, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 2 \^'/i/\,/-^ * ' ~DCG&/Cisrk 
V "v>, ./ 
Telephone: 322-3551 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 






ELLIS HADERLIE LEHMBERG, 
Defendant. ) 
ORDER AMENDING DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D82-1770 
C\nu\ ^ 
The Defendant's motion to Amend Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce came on for 
hearing on the 5th day of April, 1983, before the 
Honorable Judith Billings, Judge, and the Plaintiff 
represented by Jim Mitsunaga, Esquire, and Defendant 
represented by Thorn D. Roberts, Esquire, and the Court 
having heard the arguments of counsel and good cause 
appearing, It Is Hereby Ordered that the Defendant's 
Motion be and is hereby denied, except that Paragraph 8 
of the Divorce Decree should be amended to include the 
following order: 
That the Plaintiff shall assume and pay the 
indebtedness due to Plaintiff's parents and shall hold 
JlMI MlTSUNAGA 
ATTORNEY AT L A W 
the Defendant harmless from any claims arising thereform. 
lis rtfa-^ day of -ftfSll, 1983. DATED t h i d2Si2l 
Approved as to torm: 
Thorn. D. Roberts 
Attorney for Defendant 





Attorney for the Plaintiff 
731 Eaat South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone* 322-3551 
ISSUED 
IH THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 






ELLIS HADERLIE LEHHBERG, 
Defendant. ) 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
C i v i l No. D82-1770 
JlMI MtTBUMAUA 
A f t O K x r * * T C A W 
?•• c««» M U I M T I W ^ U 
• *«.t L A K C CITY. UTAM 
BASED UPON the affidavit of the plaintiff and good 
cause appearing, it iff hereby ordered that Ben Knowlton, 
Attorney at Law, and Ellis Haderlie Lehmberg, the defendant, 
are ordered to appear before Commissioner Sandra S. Pueler, 
in Courtroom IC, in the Salt Lake City Courts Building 
at 240 East 400 South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 
2lLtLday o f August , 1983, at the hour of 2 p .m., then 
and there to show caise, if any Ben Knowlton, Attorney at Law, 
has, why the amount of Five Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine 
Dollars and ninety-five cents ($5,599.95), with interest there-
on from the date of divorce should not be paid to the plaintiff, 
and for Ellis Haderlie Lehrr.be rg, the defendant, why a judgnent 
in the amount of 1, 057. /0 amount for child support arrearage 
should not be entered against him, and further, why he should 
not be held in contempt of Court. 
DATED this 22 day of July, 1983. 
A T T ^ V BY'TKE COUPT: 
H Oi \0*'n' i i \ '^\ r>, 
11 STRICT CCnP.T JUDGE 
]f\oo <9*y 
- ^ y-<x&\js'nJ ojjinovtu'zti y 4L Plaintiff J ~ 
„vC 
Defendant Q 
CASE NO: JO 8 3L-/TI0 





P.Atty: Q / ^ i / Yhijh<u^r\n atc^j ' 
D. Atty: ^<]h.cn\j iQ. L& /</ V / J * ~ 
Summons. 
Waiver 
QSC. ^piljk^Ji Other. 
Stipulation 
Publication 
Sworn & Examined: ^(Ctt^ <T\IC-CU{*\SL ^ 
Deft: U'i d^c A. y^n^/A/^Ci 
L Clerk 
Pltf:. 
D Default of Pltf/Deft Entered 
Date: *%.pL ? /y*3 
Others: 
udge: J^h/AasnL M t^^ii 
Reporter: 




D Custody Evaluation Ordered D Custody Awarded To 
• Visitation Rights 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
D Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:. 
Per Month 
Per Month/Year • Alimony Waived 
• Atty. fees to the 
• Home To: 
in the amount of • Deferred 
• Furnishings To: 
• Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
• Restraining Order Entered Against 
.Automobile To: 
• Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $. 
D 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
G Divorce Granted To As 
G Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry • 3-Month Interlocutory 
D Former Name of . Is Restored 
• Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft. 
Returnable .Bail. 
G Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
[2 Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders 
/? Jffln ; -ti£rt h> ; 7:. Ct write Co d/> ^// sni &-y%l^ y .:rLL ti£C-X' J.C & U-tO 
jfroo 3 a Si 
HLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
SFP 9 2 1QfH 
J I M I MITSUNAGA £ lDOJ 
Attorney for the Pla int i f f ^V^indieyfqieck3,<dist. Couct 
731 East South Temple Street $ ''Y^(XftAA^AXl&^ 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 410 2 H Deputy deck 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 2 2 - 3 5 5 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN LEHMBERG, 
P l a i n t i f f , ORDER ' ( ' 
v s . ) 
ELLIS HARDERLIE LEHMBERG, 
) 
Defendant. 
Civil No. D82-1770 
The Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on for 
hearing on the 8th day of September, 1983, at the hour 
of 2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, 
Judge, and the Plaintiff present in person and 
represented by Jimi Mitsunaga- and the Defendant present 
in person and represented by Thorn D. Roberts, and the 
Court being advised of the premises and upon 
stipulation of the parties It Is Hereby Ordered that 
the Court is without jurisdiction on Benjamin B. Knowlton 
on the issue of the disposition of funds held by 
Benjamin B. Knowlton in trust in the above entitled 
matter; further, the Plaintiff is awarded a judgment in 
the sum of $1,100.65 for arrearages in child support 
ADO 3( 
up to and including August, 1983, and costs of Court in 
the amount of $8.35. 
DATED this day of September, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
y- M (\rly-
BRYANT H. CROFT, Jiifrge // 
U AiTEST 
Approved as to form: 
Thorn D. Roberts "JF^c^Vl^U 
Attorney for Defenda n t \J 
Aoo 3*2_ 
Mr* \nmi Mitsunaga 
Attorney at Law 
731 Hast South Temple 




and Karen Lehmberc 
my records that I 
With respect to your recent OSC involving the Lehmbergs, and pursuant to 
my records of the trust funds I have held pending the outcome of same, 
please be advised that the check I issued 
was in error. I have noticed as a result 
was ordered by the court initially to pay for the expenses of repairing 
a vehicle then being operated and in the temporary possession of your 
client, which was done. The amount of which was $500.00. Said funds 
were, issued to Mr. Ellis Lehmberg to accomcdate and fulfill said obligation. 
The check I issued you did not reflect that particular deduction of the 
trust funds. As a result thereof, and thanking you personally for calling 
my attention to same, please find enclosed a check for the appropriate 
amount. Also be advised that I have caused a stop payment order lo be 
issued on the erroneous check heretofore issued 
End: Check 
BPK/sk 
Yours t r u l y , 
BENJAM] 




BEN P. KNOWLTON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
TRUST ACCOUNT Sept 22 
243 EAST 4TH SOUTH SUITE 100 531-0523 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
3aytothe .Karen Lehmberg-










F(V Lehmberg T rus t f . , ^ 
Rut Interatala Bank of Utah 
University Oftlca 
235 South 1300 Eaat 
Salt laka City. Utah 84102 / ? > - . - W ^ - -
i: i auoao? u«: o? aa?oo &»• 0 353 
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'that would be held in abeyance and trust, pending the 
final ajudication of the matter. The matter was 
before, I believe, Judge Uno who served as a judge pro 
tern at the time. Ellis was present, Karen was 
present, I was present and Tom was present; and also 
Benjamin was present. 
Q. Ben Knowlton? 
A- Excuse me, Benjamin Knowlton. 
Q. Do you remember approximately when that 
order to show cause hearing took place? 
A. I don' t have i t . 
Q. Would May of 1982 sound approximately --
A. Probably right. At that time, I might 
Indicate that the Court indicated that the money be 
held in trust, and at that time Dave Knowlton 
acknowledged that that would be the case pending the 
final ajudication of the matter. 
Q. And how did Mr. Knowlton acknowledge 
that? 
A. I believe that the words were that, yes, 
he will hold it until the Court makes a decision. 
MR. ROBERTS: I object and move to strike 
°n the basis of the best evidence, that there would 
b e
 a transcript available to the district court of 



























BY MR. ROBERTS: 
Q. Will you state your name for the record 
please? 
A. D. Aron Stanton. 
Q. And are you an attorney in the state of 
Utah? 
A. I am. 
Q. Are you familiar with the Respondent, 
Mr. Benjamin Knowltan? 
A. I am. 
Q. When did you first meet Ben? 
A. Probably seven years ago, maybe eight. 
Q. How how did you happen to come to meet 
Ben? 
A. Hung out together. 
Q. During 1982 and '83, were you acquainted 
with Mr. Knowlton? 
A. Yes 
Q. How did you know him? 
A. We officed together. 
Q. Did there come a time either in '82 or 
'83 when Mr. Knowlton consulted with you with regard 
to a legal matter involving himself? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. And did that have to do, also, with 
71 
« regard to some monies involving the Lehmbergs which,he 
z had? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. When did he contact you to the best of 
g your information? 
5 A. According to my file, would have been the 
7 latter part of January because he brought to me --
8 Q. 1983? 
9 I A. Yes. 
10 Q. How do you date that? How do you know it 
11 was about then? 
12 MS. BURDICK: I would like to interpose an 
13 objection for the record. I understand that 
14 Mr* Stanton has been called out of order and that he 
15 needs to go back to his office. Normally, testimony 
16 as to the attorney's state of mind which I anticipate 
17 Mr. Stanton's testimony would come in at a sanction 
18 stage because his intent goes to the severity of the 
19 sand:ion, not the technical violation disciplinary 
20 rule. With that understanding I don't have any 
21 objection to him proceeding at this point; otherwise I 
22 would normally ask that that testimony wait until 
23 after ~the panel makes a determination as to 
24 disciplinary rule violation and then begins the 
25 sanction hearing portion of the proceedings. 
BEVERLY LOWR —nAPTTHT. RPDnoTroc AOtf %C* 
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MR. KENT: Thank you. Your objection will 
be noted for the record. Go ahead and proceed. 
MR. ROBERTS: I'm concerned as to whether 
or not I should address that. This individual's 
testimony also goes to whether or not an unethical 
violation has occurred. With regard to conduct 
evidence rule, I don't want to have it introduced 
solely for the purpose of litigation. 
MR. KENT: We have not ruled that. I just 
noted the objection for the record. 
Q. BY MR. ROBERTS: Okay. The question was 
how are you able to identify that the contact would 
have been made toward the end of January 1983? 
A* Mr. Knowlton gave me a letter; in fact I 
have the original that was written by the attorney, 
Jimi Mitsunaga. It was dated January the 26th, 1983, 
that advised Mr. Knowlton that the Lehmberg matter --
MS. BURDICK: Objection; that's hearsay. 
I've never seen the letter. 
MR. KENT: This was a letter from --
MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Mitsunaga to 
Mr. Knowlton. 
MR. ROBERTS: He did testify he wrote a 
letter to Mr. Knowlton and informed Mr. Knowlton right 
after the trial that this was the outcome of the case 
73 
1 and he wanted the money. 
2 MR. KENT: There was some testimony 
3 regarding that, and Mr. Mitsunaga will be back and 
4 could be cross-examined about the letter, so we'll 
5 allow him to answer the question. 
6 A. Which letter stated that the monies that 
7 Mr. Knowlton held in trust for the Lehmbergs was to b 
6 paid to Mrs. Lehmberg under the award by the Court in 
9 the decree of divorce. 
10 Q. What is the date of that letter? 
11 A. January 26, 1983. 
12 MS. BURDICK: Do you have a copy of that 
13 letter? 
14 A. I have the the original that 
15 Mr. Mitsunaga wrote. 
16 MS. BURDICK: I prefer that we put that 
17 into evidence, Counsel. 
18 (Exhibit R-4 marked) 
19 MR. KENT: Do you have any objection to a 
20 photocopy being used to replace the original? 
21 J MS. BURDICK: No objection. 
22 MR. KENT: Exhibit R-4 will be received 
23 and it may be substituted for a photocopy as soon as 
24 we have a break. 
25 n. BY MR. ROBERTS: Did Mr. Knowlton consult 
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j you with regard to those monies? 
2 I A• Yes, he did. 
3 Q* Did you do any legal research in 
4 connection with Mr. Knowlton's position? 
5 A. Yes, I did. 
6 Q. What issues were you researching at that 
7 time? 
8 MR. KENT: Excuse me. Just for the 
9 record, I don't know if anyone has ever said on the 
10 record Mr. Stanton's profession. Maybe we ought to 
11 lay some foundation for expertise. 
12 Q. BY MR. ROBERTS: I thought I asked if you 
13 I were a Utah lawyer. You are authorized to practice in 
14 the State of Utah? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And you were so in 1982 and 1983? 
17 A. Yes . 
18 Q. What issues were you researching in 
19 connection with those monies of Mr. Knowlton? 
20 A. Whether or not he had a legal or 
21 attorney's lien on the monies that he held in trust 
22 for the Lehmbergs. 
I 
23 Q. What did he indicate to you was the basis 
24 of his claim? 
25 A. He brought me the letter and said, "I had 
75 
received this letter* I would like for you to do some 
research for me to determine whether or not that the 
ral money I hold in trust for the Lehmbergs" -- and he 
ml indicated that he had represented both the Lehmbergs 
r I 
gj-i _- "whether or not if I have any legal -- or if I have 
gH a lein on that money for attorney's fees that were due 
|H and owing and not paid". 
[8 Q* Did he indicate the nature of those 
•9 attorney's fees that were due and owing and unpaid? 
5f0 A. No, he didn' t . 
11 Q. Did he ask you to determine the proper 
12 legal course of action for him to take? 
13 A. Well, under the standpoint that he asked 
14 I me if he had any legal right to a lien on 
15 those monies, yes, and asked me how to go about it. 
16 Q% You did research and were able to develop 
17 an opinion as to what would be an appropriate course 
18 of conduct for Mr* Knowlton? 
19 A* Based upon what he told me, yes. 
20 Q. Did you advise him as to that opinion? 
21 A. Yes, I did. 
22 Q, When would you have advised him as to 
23 that opinion? 
24 A. It was probably shortly thereafter 



























determine what constitutes an attorney's lien and the 
statute itself is clear on the face, based upon the 
facts of the situation he told me, that he in fact, 
would have an attorney's lien on that money. 
Q. And what did you advise him what actions 
he could take? 
A. Actually, what I did, I just took him a 
copy of the statute and said here is the statute. 
That's the law right now and states that you do have a 
lien upon that money, and whatever your attorney fees 
are according to the statute, you have an attorney's 
lien to that money. 
Q. Did you indicate whether or not it would 
be proper for him to take that money at that time 
based upon that lien? 
A. No, I didn't. Maybe by inuendo I did, 
but I didn't say you have a right. 
Q. Did you indicate what action he would 
have to take to further perfect his attorney lien? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Did you discuss the possibility of filing 




No, I didn't. 
Did he compensate you for that advice? 
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A. Ellis Haderly Lehmberg. 
Q. And do you know Mr. Benjamine Knowlton 
here? 
A• Yes, I do. 
Q. How long have you known him? 
A. 2 5 years . 
Q. Did he help out in connection with the 
sale of a house which you owned in legal title with 
your wife Karen Lehmberg's parents back in 1982? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Had he represented you on other matters 
prior to that time? 
A• Yes > 
Q. What type of matters? 
A. Lawsuits, back child support, speeding 
tickets * 
Q. Were there -- at the time the house was 
sold, did you owe Ben a lot of money for lawyer's 
fees? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you ever add it up personally 
yourself prior to that time how much you would have 
owed him? 
A. Yes, I just put it together in my head, a 
lot of it. It was around four, five, six, seven 
1T6 
1 the monies that were being held by Mr. Knowlton. 
2 Q. Where was Mr. Knowlton with proximity to 
3 the court when this was discussed? 
4 A. He was on the the first row in the 
5 circular court rooms in the Metropolitan Hall of 
6 Justice* 
7 Q. What was said, if anything, as near as 
8 you can recall? 
9 A. There was a concern as to the existence 
10 and nature of those monies, and if they were were 
11 being held by Mr. Knowlton since Mr. Mitsunaga, on 
12 behalf of his client was seeking mutual restraining 
13 orders, restrainig the parties from disposing of those 
14 funds. 
15 I made reference to Mr. Knowlton's 
16 appearance in the court room. He stood up; reference 
17 was made to the fact that he was holding them in a 
18 trust account. 
19 Q. What if anything did Mr. Knowlton say? 
20 A. Would have been something to the effect 
21 of, "Yes, your Honor. Yes, I do." It was more of a 
22 nature of recognition that he was a lawyer; that he 
23 did have the monies that we had been talking about. 
24 I Q. Did Judge Uno direct or order 
25 I Mr. Knowlton to do anything in any regard? 
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1 A* He did not. 
2 Q. At that time or any other time in this 
3 divorce proceeding? 
4 A. He did not. That was under the old 
5 rotational system. I think that was his only 
6 involvement with the case, and I don't know of any — 
7 I'm not aware of any other judge directing 
8 Mr. Knowlton to do anything, or making any 
9 determination binding on Mr. Knowlton during those 
10 proceedings. 
11 Q. In fact, after the divorce was resolved 
12 by way of the divorce decree and/or the amendment to 
13 the divorce decree, an order to show cause was served 
14 upon Mr. Knowlton; is that correct? 
15 A. He was served with an order to show 
16 cause. 
17 Q. Was that to appear before the Domestic 
18 Relations Commissioner? 
19 A. It was initially styled that way. 
20 However, he was directed to 3*udge Croft. 
21 Q. And that was because of your conflict 
22 with the Domestic Relations Commissioner? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. "She" being your wife, correct? 
25 A. Back then, she was only my client. No 
133 
1 I was aware previous to that time that 
2 Mr. Knowlton had a claim for attorney's fees in 
3 connection with having or perfecting a security 
4 interest and/or immediate claim to these monies as 
5 opposed to any other that would come about in 
6 connection with his assertion with the claim for an 
7 attorney lein, which I reflected by correspondence to 
8 my client dated January 27 prior to -- 1983 -- prior 
9 to the rendition of a divorce decree and the vesting 
10 of any interest in and to the money as between 
11 Mr. and Mrs. Lehmberg to Mrs. Lehmberg. 
12 Q. Are you telling us, Mr. Roberts -- prior 
13 to the divorce decree being entered, to your knowledge 
14 did Mr. Ben Knowlton claim an interest in the specific 
15 funds in question? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. When? 
18 A. Based upon my letter dated January 27, 
19 1983, it would have been that day or the day before, 
20 because that letter was sent after a conversation I 
21 had with Mr. Knowlton in his office where we discussed 
22 the attorney's lein which I make reference to in my 
23 letter to Mr. Lehmberg. 
24 I MR. GALLEGOS: That is when Ben first 
25 | tells you that he's claiming an interest in this 
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1 BY MR. ROBERTS: 
2 Q. State your name for the record, please. 
3 A* Benjamin Peter Knowlton. 
4 I Q. And are you an attorney licensed to 
5 practice law in the State of Utah? 
6 A. Yes,I am. 
7 Q. How long have you been licensed in the 
8 State of Utah? 
9 A• Since 1981. 
10 Q. Are you licensed or have you been 
11 licensed in any other jurisdictions? 
12 A. Yes, I have. 
13 Q. What jurisdictions and when? 
14 A. State of California 1980. 
15 Q. Are you acquainted and familiar with a 
16 Mr. Ellis Lehmberg? 
17 A. Yes , I am. 
18 Q. How long have you known him? 
19 A. Since approximately 1962, I guess, or 
20 f61; somewhere in there. 
21 I Q. Subsequent to your becoming a lawyer in 
22 the State of Utah, did you act on his behalf as an 
23 attorney? 
24 A. Yes, I have. 
25 Q. Prior to May of 1982, which was when th 
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1 divorce was initiated, had you done substantial 
2 representation of Mr. Ellis Lehmberg? 
3 A. Yes, I did. 
4 Q. What types of cases did you represent him 
5 concerning; general, civil, criminal? 
6 A. Both civil and criminal. 
7 Q. Had you, prior to May of 1982, received 
8 much payment for legal fees? 
9 A. May of 1982? 
10 Q. Yes. 
11 A. Prior to May? 
12 Q. Yes. 
13 A. I!m not sure I know how to answer that 
14 question. 
15 Q. In April of 1982, did you represent and 
16 assist Mr. Lehmberg in connection with the sale of a 
17 residence? 
18 A. Yes, I did. 
19 Q. When and what were the circumstances 
20 under which you first became involved in doing that? 
21 A. Mr. Lehmberg approached me and notified 
22 me of a foreclosure that was pending on his and 
23 Karen's house, the trustee sale had been noticed up. 
24 Was scheduled for sale -- trustee sale 20th day of 
25 April 1982 at the hour of 10 0,clock. 
142 
1 A. It's Exhibit P-4 and what has been marked 
2 as R-8. 
3 MS. BURDICK: If we are we going to have 
4 any further testimony with respect to some foundation, 
5 I'd like to see it, please. 
6 Q. BY MR. ROBERTS: The attorney's fees 
7 listed in the settlement to be paid, did you receive 
8 those funds directly from the title company in 
9 connection with the closing? 
10 A. Are you referring to the $2,000? 
11 Q. Yes. 
12 A. I did. 
13 Q. And what were those funds for? What 
14 attorney's fees were those funds for? 
15 A. For negotiating the sale of the house, 
16 and also handling the creditors and what not. 
17 Q. Were there other attorney's fees due and 
18 owing at that time from Mr. Lehmberg? 
19 A. Yes, there were. 
20 Q. And this 2,000 attorney's fees did not 
21 reflect payment toward any of those past --
22 A. No, they did not. 
23 MR. ROBERTS: I move for the admission of 
24 Respondent's Exhibit 8. 
25 MR. KENT: Any objection? 
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1 MS- BURDICK: No objection. 
2 MR. KENT: R-8 will be received. 
3 Q. BY MR. ROBERTS: In April of 1982, had 
4 you told and/or prepared a written statement to 
5 I Mr. Lehmberg of all the fees that were outstanding and 
6 owing to you? 
7 A. No, not as of that date. 
8 Q. Had you kept him advised in writing on 
9 the ongoing nature of your relationship as to the 
10 attorney's fees that he had incurred and had owed you? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. At that time, did you estimate in your 
13 own mind the amount that was due and owing at that 
14 time? 
15 A. Well, approximately, I had an idea. I 
16 didn't maintain a billing system that would reference 
17 that information* Ellis and I were close friends and 
18 I handled a lot of matters for him, and I didn't find 
19 it necessary to try any itemization until later in 
20 time. 
21 Q. When you received Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, 
22 I the proceeds check, the remaining $5599.95, did 
23 Mrs. Lehmberg direct you with regard to anything you 
24 should do with those funds? 
25 A. No, she did not. 
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1 Q. Did you have any conversation --
2 A. No, wait a minute, do you mean Mrs. Ellis 
3 Lehmberg here? 
4 Q. Yes. 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Other than this check, were there any 
7 other written documents that you ever received 
8 setting forth any terms and conditions of any trust 
9 with respect to these monies? 
10 A. No, there were no written documents. 
11 Q. Did Alta Title Company make any expressed 
12 directions with respect to your actions as trustee in 
13 connection with those funds? 
14 A. No, they did not. 
15 Q. When did you first become aware of the 
16 pendency of the divorce between Ellis and Karen 
17 Lehmberg? 
18 A. I'm not certain of the date, but I think 
19 it was just shortly after Ellis was served with a 
20 summons and complaint; but then again, I may have 
21 become aware of it before Ellis, because I may have 
22 had a conversation with Karen regarding it. I don't 
23 recall exactly. 
24 Q. Did you ever enter an appearance of 
25 counsel on behalf of Mr. Lehmberg in that divorce 
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1 case? 
2 A. I don't believe I ever did, no. 
3 Q* I believe that you went over to the 
4 courthouse in connection with the original orders to 
5 show cause; do you recall that? 
6 A. Well, I recall going over with you and 
7 Mr. Lehmberg. 
8 Q. What was the reason you went over there? 
9 A. Well, Ellis was a friend of mine and so 
10 was Karen and so were you, and you were across the 
11 street in my office as I recall, discussing, it and I 
12 didn't have anything better to do so I walked over 
13 with you• 
14 Q. You of course, have not been served with 
15 any documents and you were not a party to that 
16 proceeding? 
17 A. That is correct. 
18 Q. While you were in the courtroom, did the 
19 judge, to your knowledge and understanding, make any 
20 order with respect to you and any monies that you 
21 might have of either Ellis or Karen Lehmberg? 
22 A. To the best, of my recollection, yes. 
23 Q. What did he say? 
24 I A. Well, as I recall, I think it was you 




























courtroom and I stood up and he said "Mr. Knowlton are 
you holding any of these parties funds in trust?" and 
I said, "Yes", and he said, "Are you adverse to 
spending -- or making available some funds to repair 
Karen's car so Ellis could have his car?" and I said 
"No, I'm not adverse to that." and my impression -- or 
at least that he told me then to go ahead and do it. 
Q. Did you subsequently release some of 
those funds to Mr. Lehmberg? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How much did you release? 
A. Well, I initially thought I had released 
$500, but in going through the records, apparently I 
released $600 for the purpose of repairing the car or 
. one of the cars so Karen could have that car so she 
would release Ellis' car. That was my understanding 







I show you the third page of Plaintiff's 
Yes 
Is that the $600 you're making reference 
Yes . 
Q. Were you aware of settlement negotiations 
prior to January 25th, 1983 between Mr. Mitsunaga and 
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1 myself in connection with those monies? 
2 A. Not with any sufficient particularity. 
3 Q. Did you, prior to January 25th, 1983 the 
4 date of the hearing or the date of the trial in the 
5 Lehmberg's divorce, believe you had any specific 
6 interest in and to those particular monies that you 
7 had in your account? 
8 A. I did. 
9 Q. And what was the basis for that belief 
10 you had an interest in and to those specific monies? 
11 A. Twofold. Number 1, I had performed 
12 considerable legal services for Ellis and peripheral! 
13 J I guess fo,r Karen on several matters; karen just a 
14 few — two of them that I can think of. 
15 Secondly, I had, in fact, loaned Ellis 
16 money just prior to., and all this was prior to the 
17 date of the filing of the divorce, and I assumed that 
18 payment was forthcoming from those funds, and as I 
19 recall, Ellis had even suggested that prior to the 
20 filing of this divorce. 
21 Q. Did there also come a time when you had 
22 I occasion to contact Mr. Dan Stanton? 
23 | A. Yes, there was. 
24 | Q. Do you have any idea of when that would 
25 I have been? 
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considered Karen a friend and I considered Ellis a 
friend. That's why I wouldn't represent either one of 
them in hairy divorce; matter of fact, I tried to get 
them back together. 
I was concerned, not merely as a lawyer, 
but I guess as a lawyer and as a friend, that if I was 
to take all this money and put an attorney's lien on 
it and prevail on keeping all the money, most of it 
was to go to the benefit of Ellis Lehmberg, and 
because of the majority of legal problems that I had 
undertaken the representations were primarily for 
Ellis. 
The majority -- I will say, that as I 
recall of the judgments and the liens that I had tried 
to get satisfied for 50 cents on the dollar, were in 
fact incurred by Ellis, not by Karen; so I thought it 
was unfair to try and chastize Karen. Now, maybe I'm 
in the wrong place in making that kind of decision. 
So, at any rate, I tried to make a 
settlement and compromise. I sat down and I thought 
"Well, yeah Ellis, owes you a bunch of money and 
that's true, but on the other hand, why should Karen 
have to pay for it now they're involved in a divorce?11 
So I tried to settle it. I thought 
$2500 isn't very much but why not send her the 
^, / 
152 
1 balance, and so I tendered the balance of it and I 
2 said, "All right, Jimi, here; why don't you take this 
3 and give it to Karen". 
4 Q. How did you arrive at the figure of 
5 $2500? 
6 A, $2500, I donft know. Just talking to 
7 Ellis. I don't know. He and I kind of just chatted 
8 about it. I suggested this, and a lot of it has to do 
9 with the money I lent him out of my back pocket for 
10 different things before they ever filed for divorce. 
11 It's just a matter of paying me back certain funds 
12 that I had advanced him. Plus — I don't know why, to 
13 tell you the truth. 
14 Q. Check number 293, that first check for 
15 the sum of $3384? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Is that the balance you figured after 
18 taking -- deducting the $2500? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Did you deliver that personally to Jimi, 
21 or do you recall? 
22 A. I don't know if I delivered it 
23 personally, or if I mailed it. Seems like I mailed it 
24 to him. 



























A. Oh, I was thinking about the divorce 
trial. Now, would you please rephrase your question? 
Q. Did you appear at that trial? 
A. No, I did not. I appeared at the 
pre-trial when the trial got continued. 
Q. Were you present during the discussion 
between Mr. Mitsunaga, your counsel Dave Knowlton, and 
the judge with regard to the issues? 
A. I was in the hallway, outside his chamber 
door . 
Q. Why didn't you appear at the time of 
trial? 
A. Well, for the reason specified in my 
affidavit here. I was in Alaska. I assumed the trial 
was going to be continued. It was continued for the 
sole purpose of securing the deposition of Ellis, and 
I was in Alaska. I was not -- couldn't get back by 
automobile, and I wasn't exactly in Fairbanks. I was 
quite a ways from there, and when I found out the 
matter wasn't going to be continued or something, I 
think I called my brother David and asked him about it 
and he said, "As long as Ellis is here and we get 
somebody to put on the defense, we really don't need 
you," and so I assumed everything was going to go fine 
and found out it didn't, unfortunately. 
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1 evidence that you would have presented to show what 
2 that amount was, in fact. 
3 A. Nobody has asked me that. 
4 Q. I think that question has been asked, but 
5 if you have something, let's hear it now, perhaps. 
6 A. I did not make this calculation at that 
7 time, all right? I knew that a substantial amount of 
8 that was my money. I didn't anticipate there would be 
9 any problem anyway, because I wasn't breaching any of 
10 the terms and condition of trustee, and Ellis owed me 
11 a substantial amount of money, and so I had 
12 reservations about how much or if any, Karen should 
13 receive, and so I sat back and waited. 
14 Later on when it became apparent that we 
15 were going to court I tallied it up and I came out 
16 with the figure of, looks like 7550, but that didn't 
17 include some other funds which I would guess about 350 
18 for another -- other monies that I had spent in 
19 Ellis's behalf back in March. So --
20 Q. If I were to ask for an itemization of 
21 J that 7550, could you give it to us at any time? 
22 I A. Not that complete. I can give you the 
23 dates, I can give you the case numbers, and I can give 
24 you an amount which is I think -- I have predicated 
25 I this on about $80 an hour. 
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disciplinary rule violations. 
MR. ROBERTS: Okay. 
MR. KENT: Okay. We are, at this time, I 
guess, at your disposal. If you would like to proceed 
with the sanction stage of the proceedings, we are 
prepared to do that. If you would like to take a 
brief recess and discuss things, we are certainly 
happy to do that, too. 
MS. BURDICK: We are suggesting giving you 
an opportunity to consent to discipline. We can do 
that if you want to. And I'd be happy to do that. 
MR. KENT: We will go off the record for a 
minute . 
(Discussion off the record) 
Back on the record. After the brief recess, 
everyone is back in place here. How do you wish to 
proceed at this time? 
MR. ROBERTS: Well, at the risk of 
developing a reputation that I never let the case die, 
we have somewhat of a stipulation with regard to the 
sanctions phase. There is a certain amount of 
uncertainty that I have, and I think Miss Berry 
somewhat shares that with respect to the findings, or 
the conclusions as to this violation, but we would be 
willing to stipulate as follows: 
REBECCA JANKE — CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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1 That if your finding of violation of 
2 dishonesty by the conversion was based upon actual 
3 evil or improper intent on Mr. Knowlton's behalf/ if 
4 it was actual bad faith in terms of the taking of the 
5 money/ then an appropriate sanction would be --
6 MS. BURDICK: And before you go on to that/ 
7 as opposed to dishonesty where he was in good faith 
8 relying on advice that he had a valid attorney's lien/ 
9 which of course is not our position/ but that's the 
10 issue in terms of mitigation or aggravation/ is what 
11 his state of mind was in committing that dishonest act 
12 that violated the rule. 
13 MR. ROBERTS: Okay. So # assuming it was the 
14 first/ that he took it with intent --
15 MS. BURDICK: The knowledge of the 
16 wrongfulness of the taking --
17 MS. SUMNER; If I may, Mr. Chairman, I don't 
18 think that that is what we were thinking. I think 
19 that what we were thinking is that it 'was a situation 
20 probably more like unto negligence, but probably gross 
21 negligence. And we can hear from the other panel 
22 members. I don't see any reason why we can't openly 
23 d iscuss tha t. 
24 MR. KENT: We specifically made no finding 
25 regarding that issue because the point in determining 
